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' EDWARD NIELSEN, / ) 
Defendant - Appellant. j 
Case No. 14173 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case in which the defendant was 
charged with having in his possession a dangerous weapon after 
having been convicted of a crime of violence, in violation of 
Section 76-10-503, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The defendant was found guilty, by a jury, of the 
crime of possession of a dangerous weapon by a convicted per-
son, after trial of the matter before the Honorable J. Robert 
Bullock, Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant, by this appeal, seeks to have the jury 
verdict vacated and the matter remanded to the Fourth Judicial 
District Court for a new trial upon the ground and for the 
reasons as stated herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Throughout this brief, the party appellant, Parley 
Edward Nielsen, will be referred to as the defendant, and the 
party respondent, The State of Utah, will be referred to as 
the plaintiff. 
On the 21st day of December, 1972, the defendant, 
Parley Edward Nielsen, was convicted by a jury of the charge 
of assault with a deadly weapon. (Tr.ll). Defendant was later 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison pursuant to the requirements 
of the statute and was later paroled from said prison during the 
early summer of 1974. 
On the 7th day of December, 19 74, the defendant visited 
at "Al's Lounge" (actually named Carolyn's Billiards Tr.40) in 
Pleasant Grove, Utah. The defendant was in the lounge between 
the hours of 7:00 ofclock p.m. and midnight. The lounge was 
dimly lit and in certain areas was rather dark, particularly in 
the area where the bar is located. (Tr.58). The defendant 
visited with one Jolene Smith at the bar and then seated him-
self in an eating booth where he engaged in a conversation with 
one Pat Truman. (Tr.93). The defendant had an M-l carbine clip 
in his hand and handed it to Pat Truman. Pat Truman took the 
bullets out of the clip and handed the clip and bullets back 
to the defendant separately. (Tr.93-94). During the process 
of removing the cartridges from the clip, some of them were 
dropped on the table of the eating booth attracting the atten-
tion of other persons in the lounge. (Tr.94). Sometime later 
the defendant left the lounge and did not return. 
On the 3rd and 6th of January, 1975, a warrant of 
arrest and complaint were issued respectively. Upon defen-
dant's hearing of the warrant for his arrest he visited the 
police station in Pleasant Grove and was there arrested on the 
charge of being in possession of a dangerous weapon after hav-
ing committed and being convicted of a crime of violence. On 
January 9, 1975, the defendant was arraigned and given a copy 
of the Complaint. Preliminary hearing was set for the 20th 
of January, 1975, and continued to the 10th of February, 1975. 
.The defendant was bound over for arraignment on the 21st of 
February, 19 75, and was arraigned before the Fourth District 
Court for Utah County on the 28th of February, 19 75. There-
after, on the 7th day of March, 19 75, the defendant entered 
his plea of not guilty. The matter was tried on the 8th day 
of April, 19 75, before the Fourth District Court, the Honor-
able J. Robert Bullock sitting, and after trial of the*matter 
the jury returned a verdict of guilty and the defendant was 
sentenced to. the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years. 
The defendant requested the appointment of counsel to 
prosecute his case on appeal. Counsel was appointed and this 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS 
NUMBERED 6 AND 7. 
The defendant was charged with violation of Section 
76-10-503, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, entitled "Possession of 
Dangerous Weapon by Convicted Person, Drug Addict, or Mentally 
Incompetent Person Prohibited." The pertinent language of the 
statute is as follows: 
"Any person who is not a citizen of the United 
States, or any person who has been convicted of 
any crime of violence under the laws of 
the State of Utah shall not own or have in 
his possession or under his custody or control 
any dangerous weapon as defined in this part. 
Any person who violates this section is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous 
weapon is a firearm or a sawed-off shotgun he 
shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree." 
In Section 76-10-501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the 
words "dangerous weapon" and "firearm" are defined. In sub-
paragraph 1 of said section the definition of dangerous wea-
pon appears and the language is as follows: 
"Dangerous weapon means any item that in the 
manner of its use or intended use is capable of 
causing death or serious bodily injury. In 
construing whether an item, object, or thing 
not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a 
dangerous weapon, the character of the instru-
ment, object, or thing; the character of the 
wound produced, if any; and the manner in which 
the instrument, object, or thing was used shall 
be determinative." 
In sub-paragraph 2 of said section, the word "firearm" 
is defined as follows: ! 
"Firearms means pistols, revolvers, sawed-off 
shotguns, or sawed-off rifles, and/or any device 
that could be used as a weapon from which is 
expelled a projectile by any force." 
In instructing the jury as to the law set forth in the 
above sections of the Utah Criminal Code, the Court gave its 
instructions numbered 6 and 7 which are as follows: 
"Instruction No. 6 
"The essential elements of the crime charged in 
the information are as follows: (1) That the 
defendant had a gun in his possession on or about 
December 7, 1974; (2) That sometime previously 
he had been convicted of a crime of violence under 
the laws of the state of Utah. 
"If you believe that the evidence establishes both 
of the above elements of the offense beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the de-
fendant; if the evidence has failed to so establish 
either of said elements, then you should find the 
defendant not guilty." 
"Instruction No. 7 
"For your purposes in determining guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant, assault with a deadly 
weapon is a crime of violence, and a pistol-type 
handgun is a dangerous weapon under the laws of 
this state. However, a gun clip alone with or 
without cartridges in it is not a dangerous wea-
pon within the meaning of the law under which the 
defendant is charged." 
With respect to the first instruction, Instruction No. 
6, defendant contends that in light of the evidence adduced at 
the trial that the word "gun" was improper and prejudicial and 
that the instruction should have read under the paragraph 
numbered 1 thereof: "That the defendant had a dangerous weapon 
in his possession on or about December 7, 1974," 
At the trial evidence was adduced by witnesses for the 
state that the defendant had in his hand and was waving, an ob-
ject which appeared to some of the witnesses to be a pistol or 
handgun. A Mr. Kent Gurney was called by the state and testi-
fied that he was the owner of the lounge at which the defendant 
was present on the night in question. He further testified that 
he saw "what I thought looked like" a gun in the hand of the 
defendant. (Tr.52). On cross examination Mr. Gurney testified, 
upon being shown the M-l carbine magazine, that he "couldn't 
swear that it (the carbine magazine) wasn't" the object that he 
saw in the hand of the defendant. (Tr.61). Further, the witness 
testified that he had been drinking and he did not recall speci-
fically whether the item or object in the hand of the defendant 
was made out of metal or plastic or whether or not the object 
was a gun at all. (Tr.61-62). A Mr. Craig Brackenbury was 
called and testified that he had come into the bar; that he did 
not know the defendant prior thereto, and that he saw a gun or 
what appeared to be a gun tucked into the waistband of#the 
pants of the defendant with the handle portion of said object 
or gun exposed. (Tr. 71-73). A Mrs. Evelyn Ekins was called 
as a witness for the state and testified that she was working 
in the lounge on the night in question as a cocktail waitress. 
-6-
She recalled the defendant coming to the lounge and that she 
saw what appeared to be a gun in his hand. (Tr.76-78). There-
after, a Miss Pat Truman was called to testify for the state, 
was declared an adverse witness, and on cross examination by 
counsel for the state testified that she had seen the M-l 
carbine magazine in the hand of the defendant, that she had 
obtained it from him, extracted the cartridges therefrom, some 
of which dropped on the table, and handed back to the defendant 
the magazine housing and the unexpired cartridges. Miss Truman 
further testified that she did not see at any time any object 
such as a revolver or a pistol-type handgun in the hand of the 
defendant or on his person. (Tr.93-94). The state also pro-
duced a witness by the name of Greg Smith who testified that 
he was with the defendant prior to going into the lounge afore-
said, and that the defendant had in his possession a magazine 
or clip to a pistol. (Tr.39-44). 
The defendant in his case produced a witness by the 
name of Corrine McDuffy who testified that she was the owner 
of the clip in question and that she had given it to the defen-
dant for the purpose of having it repaired and that it was to 
be returned to her on the night in question. (Tr.105-108). 
The defendant also produced a witness by the name of Jolene 
Smith, wife of the state's witness, Greg Smith, and she testi-
fied that she did not at any time see a gun in the hand of the 
defendant. (Tr.114). Finally, it was stipulated that the M-l 
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carbine magazine would not operate in any handgun, revolver, 
or pistol, nor could it be adapted for such use. (Tr. 104). 
From the evidence the jury could have concluded that 
the defendant either had a magazine with unexpired cartridges, 
a clip for a handgun, or a pistol-type gun. Thus, it was 
erroneous for the Court to instruct the jury that the essential 
elements of the crime charged were that the defendant had a gun 
in his possession on or about the 7th day of December, 19 74. 
Rather, the jury should have been instructed that the defendant 
' had a dangerous weapon in his possession on or about the 7th 
day of December, 1974, inasmuch as it was the jury's prerogative 
to decide the question of whether the object or thing in the 
possession of the defendant was a gun or some other object. 
With regard to Instruction No. 7, the defendant con-
tends that the Court erred in instructing the jury that a 
pistol-type handgun is a dangerous weapon under the laws of 
the State of Utah. By the definition and language of the stat-
ute a dangerous weapon is an "item that in the manner of its 
use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury." Further, firearms is defined to include pis-
tols or revolvers. However, by the language of the statute it 
does not follow that a firearm, to-wit: a pistol or revolver, 
is a dangerous weapon per se. That is, the language of the 
statute seems to suggest that even in determining whether a 
pistol or revolver is a dangerous weapon one must consider 
' -8-
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whether said item in its use or intended use would be likely 
to cause serious bodily injury or death. The jury was not 
instructed in this manner and it is defendant's position and 
contention that were the jury instructed to consider whether 
or not the item in the possession of the defendant were a dan-
gerous weapon within the meaning of the words "dangerous weapon" 
that the jury could have found that the item in the possession 
of the the defendant, whether or not a pistol, was not a dan-
gerous weapon by reason of its being rendered incapable of 
causing serious bodily injury or death. 
POINT II | 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1. 
At the trial, the defendant presented four jury instruc-
tions which he requested the Court to give to the jury. Two of 
the instructions were not given and two were given in an 
amended form. The instruction which was not given and which 
defendant claims should have been given is as follows: 
"Instruction No. 1. You are instructed that 
a dangerous weapon means any item that in the 
manner of its use or intended use is capable of 
causing death or serious bodily injury. You 
are further instructed that in construing 
whether an item, object, or thing not commonly 
known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous 
weapon, the character of the instrument, 
object, or thing and the manner in which the 
instrument, object, or thing was used shall 
be determinative." 
Defendant contends that the above instruction should 
have been given for the reason that under the state of the 
evidence, after conclusion thereof, the jury was faced with 
the question whether the defendant had in his possession a 
pistol or the magazine to an M-1 carbine rifle and also the 
question whether the firearm was loaded or unloaded. Further, 
there was a question presented in the evidence of whether the 
pistol, if any, was capable of causing serious bodily injury 
or death. That is, the jury could have believed both that the 
defendant did have a pistol and that he also had a magazine 
for an M-1 carbine rifle, but would still be required to deter-
mine whether the pistol was loaded or whether it was capable 
of being used in conjunction with the M-1 carbine magazine and 
unexpired cartridges therein. 
Defendant contends that it was prejudicial error for 
the Court to instruct the jury simply that a hand-type pistol 
is a dangerous weapon without giving the definition of a dan-
gerous weapon and impressing upon the mind of the jury their 
need to consider the questions suggested above. 
Generally, it is held that an unloaded gun, used as 
a firearm and not as a bludgeon, is not a dangerous weapon within 
the contemplation of statutes punishing assaults made with dan-
gerous or deadly weapons. 79 Am Jur 2d Weapons and Firearms, 
Section 3. There is also authority that an unloaded revolver 
or gun merely pointed at the person is not a dangerous weapon 
within the meaning of statutes defining assault and battery 
while armed with a dangerous weapon. 79 Am Jur 2d Weapons and 
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Firearms, Section 3. Defendant recognizes and admits that 
there is a division of authority on the question of whether 
a firearm or handgun is a dangerous weapon per se, However, 
most of the cases seem to turn on the question of whether the ..... 
particular firearm or handgun was loaded and on the question 
of what particular use or intended use the handgun or firearm 
was put to in the commission of the offense. Thus, in the 
case of People v. Ford, 36 Cal. Rptr. 620, 388 P2d 892, the 
Court suggested that a pistol-type handgun is not dangerous 
per se to a burglar who steals an unloaded revolver as part of 
his loot. From said case, it appears that a pistol must be 
used in perpetration of a felony in order to be considered dan-
gerous. In State vs. Petersen, 83 Utah 74, 27 P2d 20, an assault 
case, wherein an assault was allegedly made by use of a pistol 
or handgun, the Supreme Court found that the gun was a deadly 
weapon because it was loaded and implied that were the gun un-
loaded that it would not have been considered a deadly weapon, 
per se. Thus, the question of whether or not a pistol-type 
handgun would be considered a dangerous weapon per se in the 
State of Utah does not seem to have been decided by the Supreme 
Court. 
In light of the division of authority on the question 
of whether a handgun or pistol should be considered a dangerous 
weapon per se and because the question does not seem to have 
been decided in the State of Utah, defendant offers the follow-
ing analogies to emphasize what he contends the intent of the 
-11-
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Legislature to have been in enacting the provisions of.the 
Criminal Code dealing with weapons: A person convicted of a 
crime of violence could have in his possession or under his 
custody and control a replica model of any type of weapon or 
firearm as a collector item. Since such models are not capable 
of being fired and are declared by the federal government as 
"non-guns", for which no license is required, it is feasible 
that such a weapon or replica of a weapon could be in the 
possession or control or under the custody of a person pre-
viously convicted of a crime of violence. However, even such 
a firearm, although a replica only, could, under our current 
statutes, be said to be a "dangerous weapon" if in the manner 
of its use or intended use it was capable of causing serious 
bodily injury or death, and a person having such a model or 
replica of a gun in his possession or under his custody and 
control and using it thusly, could be found guilty of the pro-
visions of Section 76-10-503, UCA, 1953. On the other hand, 
it is also within the ambit of our statute that a person pre-
viously convicted of a crime of violence could have in his 
possession an actual handgun or pistol as a collector's item 
and, although capable of firing, if said handgun or weapon in 
its use or intended use was not capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury, then the person having it in his cus-
tody or under his control would not be in violation of Section 
76-10-503, UCA, 1953. Thus, by the language and intent of 
-12-
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the statute, defendant argues that a consideration of the use 
to which the alleged dangerous weapon was put is indispensable 
to a determination of whether said alleged dangerous weapon 
was in fact a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the lan-
guage of the statute. Thus, the Court's failure to so instruct 
the jury as requested by the defendant in its instruction afore-
said, was clearly erroneous, prejudicial, and by such error 
defendant was denied a fair trial. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT'S CASE SHOULD BE REVERSED AND 
REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR RE-HEARING 
AND REDETERMINATION. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held in cases where 
the trial court has issued an improper and prejudicial jury 
instruction, that the case must be remanded for new trial. State 
of Utah vs. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 439, 519 P2d 247 (1974); State of 
Utah v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 2d 323, 234 P2d 600 (1951). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in giving 
instructions numbered 6 and 7 in that it failed to instruct the 
jury in the proper language as set forth in the statute for 
which the defendant was charged with violating, and further, 
in instructing that a handgun or pistol-type gun is a dangerous 
weapon per se within the meaning of Section 76-10-501 (1) Utah 
Criminal Code. Further, defendant contends that his requested 
-13-
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jury instruction should have been given and that failure to 
give such was prejudicial to his case, did not allow the jury 
to decide whether the item or thing which he allegedly had was 
a dangerous weapon, and left the jury only to decide whether 
or not they believed he had a gun. 
\ 
The language of Section 76-10-501 in conjunction with 
Section 76-10-503, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, requires a con-
sideration of the use or intended use to which an item or thing 
is put, in the commission or attempted commission of an offense, 
to determine whether said item or thing is a dangerous weapon 
within the meaning of the words "dangerous weapon" as defined. 
Thus, defendant respectfully submits that his case has been 
prejudiced, that he has been denied fair trial, and that by 
reason of the error committed by the trial court, his case 
should be remanded for new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GARY H. WEIGHT 
ALDRICH & NELSON 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Tel: 373-4912 
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